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Contract Law. Marr Scaffolding Co. v. FairgroundForms, Inc.,
682 A.2d 455 (R.I. 1996). Where parties to a settlement agree as
to the breadth of a general release, the court will apply an "intent
rule" to determine the applicability of the release to unnamed third
parties.
In MarrScaffolding Co. v. FairgroundForms,Inc.," the Rhode
Island Supreme Court adopted the "intent rule"2 for application in
interpreting the scope of general releases. General releases are
often used to release the parties to a settlement agreement from
future claims, and often include boilerplate language, or are
crafted by "erring artisans" as was the subject release in this case. 3
In MarrScaffolding, the supreme court refused to permit a defendant, who was not a party to the settlement agreement, to rely on
4
the omnibus language of the release to escape future claims.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The plaintiff, Marr Scaffolding Co., Inc. (Marr), rented construction material and equipment to contractors and builders.5 In
August 1990, defendant Cement Heads, Inc. (Cement Heads),
rented aluminum forms from Marr for a job in Providence, Rhode
Island, a number of which "disappeared" from the job site. 6 With
Marr's permission, Cement Heads then moved some of the material to a Westerly, Rhode Island job site, where defendant subcon7
tractor Fairground Forms, Inc. (Fairground), was also working.
The Westerly job was supervised by general contractor Professional Building Concepts, Inc. (Professional Building), which was
bonded by Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial
Union), and Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford Insurance). 8
While working at the Westerly site, Cement Heads and Fairground
1. 682 A.2d 455 (LI. 1996).
2. McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943,958 (D.II. 1986)
(predicting that Rhode Island courts would adopt the "intent rule" for interpretation of general releases).
3. Man- Scaffolding, 682 A.2d at 459.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 456.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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"swapped or borrowed Marr's leased material," without Marr's permission.9 Much of this material and equipment was also lost.1o
Marr subsequently sued Cement Heads, Fairground, Professional Building, and Commercial Union, eventually settling the
suit with the latter three defendants, since the bonding companies
were only liable for the losses Marr incurred at the Westerly site.."
Professional Building, Commercial Union and Hartford Insurance
agreed to pay Marr five thousand dollars in exchange for Marr's
signing a release.-2 Moving for summary judgment, Cement
Heads claimed that the omnibus language of the release "discharged its liability to Marr."*3 Cement Heads argued that the release was an "integrated and unambiguous written-agreement"
and as such, extrinsic evidence should not be admitted to vary or
contradict its terms. 14 Marr argued that the release only applied
to the named releasees, not to Cement Heads, and submitted supporting affidavits from attorneys for each of the parties to the release showing "that they neither bargained for nor intended to
discharge any liability that Cements Heads may have to Marr."15
Finding that the language of the release was unambiguous, and
refusing to consider the settling parties' "purported subjective in9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. The applicable part of the release stated:
Marr. .. (hereinafter referred to as 'Releasors') for and in consideration of
Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollar [sic) ... has remised, released and forever discharged and do for itself and its successors and assigns hereby
remise, release and forever discharge... Professional Building... and

Commercial Union... and... Hartford Insurance... and any and all
other persons, firms and corporations . . . (hereinafter referred to as

Releasee'), of and from any and all debts, demands, actions, causes of action, .. . controversies.... claims, rights, liabilities, suits... now existing,
or which may result from the existing state of things, which Releasors
now have or ever had against the Releasee from the beginning of the
world to the day of the date of these presents ....
in particular and without limitation of the foregoing Releasee is specifically released from any and all claims for fair market value and fair rental
of scaffolding, or any other claim made in the civil action entitled Marr
Scaffolding Co.... v. FairgroundForms... or any claims that Mart...
may have now or in the future of any nature whatsoever.
Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 457.
14. Id. at 458.
15. Id. at 457.
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tentions about the scope of the release," the motion judge granted
summary judgment to Cement Heads, and Marr petitioned for a
16
writ of certiorari.

BACKGROUND

In Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club,1 7 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court stated that unless it had an "adequate reason to do
otherwise," it would give "significant deference" to general release
terms.' 8 The adequate reason, they suggested, had to be grounded
in factual evidence regarding parties' intent, among other factors. 19 Underlying its willingness to consider the parties' intent is
the court's policy of preventing "third-party defendants from taking 'gratuitous advantage' of releases in which they took no
part,"20 particularly where the release included boilerplate language which seemingly released "the entire world from any and all
claims."2 1 In Pereira v. Tellier,22 the supreme court ruled that
where settling parties signed a supposed general release, the document only released specific parties, if the intent was not to re23
lease unnamed third parties.
ANALysiS AND HOLDING

The supreme court reviewed the lower court's order under a de
novo standard of review, applying the same criteria as the court
below, 2 4 stating that "summary judgment is appropriate when the
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the [opposing party]
shows... no genuine issue of material fact and... the [movant] is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 25
The Marr Scaffolding court followed the line of analysis
through Pardey and Pereira,finding that the superior court motion
16. Id.
17. 518 A.2d 1349, 1355 (R.I. 1986).
18. MarrScaffolding, 682 A-2d at 457 (quoting Pardey, 518 A.2d at 1355).
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943, 952
(D.R.I. 1986)).
21. Id. at 457-58 (citing Pardey, 518 A.2d at 1355).
22. 583 A-2d 523 (R.I. 1990).
23. Marr Scaffolding, 682 A-2d at 458 (citing Pereira, 583 A.2d at 524).
24. Id. at 457 (citing 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
U 56.27(1), at 56-852 (2d ed. 1993)) (citations omitted).
25. Id. (citing DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 641 A-2d 50, 53-54 (R.I. 1994)).
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judge should have examined the parties' affidavits, and possibly
held an evidentiary hearing to determine the "true intentions of
the parties to the original settlement." 26 The court noted that the
release identified the releasees by name, excluding Cement
Heads. 27 The parties' affidavits showed that the omnibus language of the release was not intended to release Cement Heads's
2
potential liability to Marr. 8
The court further rejected Cement Heads's argument that
"parties to an unambiguous written agreement" such as this release cannot vary its terms through extrinsic evidence. 29 First, the
court found parol evidence admissible in situations where parties
on both sides of the contract are mistaken about a material aspect
of the contract, which therefore does not represent "their prior
completed understanding."3 0 Second, since Cement Heads was a
stranger to the settlement agreement, it could not prevent the admission of parol evidence in the court's effort to interpret the contract. 3 ' Third, while Cement Heads contended that the release

was unambiguous on its face, the court found several ambiguities
in the instrument. 32 Rather than a global application, as Cement
Heads argued, the court found that the language defining the
"releasee" might simply refer back to the named releasees identified earlier in the same sentence. 33 The court also found that the
defendants' denial of liability in the release "creates an ambiguity
in regard to exactly who is being released," and if Marr was referring to other than the named releasees, the document "purports to
speak for the world."34 Furthermore, the release was executed in
exchange for consideration by the identified parties only, suggesting that Marr did not intend to release parties who "provided
no consideration for the release."3 5 Finally, the court noted that if
every person in the world was to be released, Marr would have released not only all current, but also all future claims against any26.

Id. at 458.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458-59.

31.
32.

Id. at 459 (citing Inman v. Marcus, 43 A-2d 320, 322 (&I. 1945)).
I&

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 460.
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one for anything.3 6 The court granted Marr's petition for
certiorari, quashed the order granting summary judgment in favor
of Cement Heads, and remanded the case to the superior court for
37
decision in accord with the "intent rule."

In dictum, the supreme court suggested that it might take a
different tack if faced with the situation where parties to a settlement did not agree that the omnibus release language was not
aimed at reaching an unnamed third party defendant. 38 Reserving
judgment on that issue, the court hinted that in such a situation
"we may be more inclined to give 'significant deference to the
[broad] terms of a general release.' 3 9 Unlike this case, a third
party defendant in that situation is likely to be construed as being
included in the omnibus language. 40 In addition, the court indicated that it would defer to the general language of the release
where a party to the settlement: 1) "paid consideration for the release" and claimed that the omnibus language was intentional and
bargained for, in order to avert future claims from unnamed third
parties, or 2) argued that the language was "otherwise of specific
41
benefit to one of the settling parties."
CONCLUSION

With its decision in Marr Scaffolding, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has cleared the path for future interpretation of
general release language which purportedly releases not only the
parties to the settlement, but also unnamed third parties. The "intent rule" requires that extrinsic evidence be admitted to show that
the parties to the original settlement did not intend to release unnamed third parties. Furthermore, a general release which purports to release the world from claims by the releasee will not bar

36. Id. The court noted that if taken literally, Marr would be committing
'business suicide," since even Marr's customers could claim immunity from meeting their obligations to Marr. Id

37.
38.
39.
1986)).
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 458.
Id. (citing Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1355 (R.I.
Id
Id.
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claims against an unnamed third party where parties to the original agreement did not so intend.
Deborah M. Kupa

